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FEENY, job applicant, non-
veteran, woman 
~  to USDC Mass. 
~~~' D.J.; Campbell, ~AJ, 
concurring; Murray, D~J., 
dissenting) ~ ~~~;--
Federal/Civil Timely 
1. SUMMARY: Appt challenges the court's holding that 
Mass. Gen. Laws c.31, §23, which affords veterans a preference 
in obtaining state civil service jobs, violates the Equal 
Protection Clause. 
2. FACTS & DECISIONS: Historically, women have been 
excluded from full participation in the nation's military forces. 
From 1948 until 1967, a federal statute proh_ibited women from 
making up more than two per cent of total personnel in the armed 
forces. The Army has continued a similar limit by regulation. 
I woo\a W)~. ~ t6W\~ts OY\ barf. ~ 
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v/ 
Since 1884, Massachusetts has given veterans a ----preference in obtaining public employment. Under present law, 
the first step in getting a public job is to take an examination. 
The test results in a composite score. Applicants who pass are 
placed on an "eligible" list and rankec;l under the formula 
established by §23, the statute in que stion here: 
1. Disabled veterans in order of their composite 
scores a 
2. Other veterans in order of their composite scores. 
3. Widows and widowed mothers of veterans in order 
of their composite scores. 
4. All other eligibles in order of their composite 
scores. 
When a job becomes available, the Civil Service Director 
certifies candidates from the top of the eligible list, and 
the hiring agency choosesfrom among those certified. Of 47 1 005 
appointments made during a 10-year period ending in 1973, 
14,476 went to male veterans and 374 went to female veterans. 
Overall, 26,794 men were hired and 20,211 women. 
fV 
~ee, a non-veteran, was a state employee who sought to 
move up the administrative ladder. In 1971, she took an examination 
for an available position, scored second, and, because of §23, 
was listed sixth on the eligible list. She was not among those 
certified and a male veteran with a lower grade got the job. 
In 1973 her story repeated itself. The court found that in 1973 
she would have been certified if the state had not given a 
she 
preference to veterans. In 1974/applied for yet · another job, 
then 
scored 17th and was ranked 70th. She/brough~ this lawsuit 
alleging §23 discriminated against women. The three-judge 
court held the statute denied her equal protection. Anthony 
v. Massachusetts, 415 F. Supp. 485 (D. Mass. 1976). The 
court enjoined the defendant state officers from enforcing 
the statute, and the Massachusetts legislature enacted a 
substitute law to have effect only during the pendency of 
this case. Juris. Stat. App. C. 
An appeal was taken to this Court and the Court 
3 
certified to the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts the 
question whether the Attorney General of that state could bring 
an appeal when none of the named defendants wanted to appeal. 
Massachusetts v. Feeney, 429 U.S. 66 (1976) ·. Mr. Justice 
Blackmun would have dismissed for want of jurisdictiorl(!) The 
Massachusetts court held the Attorney General had the authority 
to prosecute the appeal. This Co~ then vacated the judgment 
and remanded for further consideration in light of Washington 
v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976). Massachusetts v. Feeney, 434 
U.S. 884 (1977) (No. 76-265) (prior pool memos are dated 
10-6-76 and 9-28-77). Mr. Justice Brennan, Mro Justice Marshall 
and Mr. Justice Powell would have noted probable jurisdiction. 
On remand, the court reaffir.rned its prior holding. 
The effect of veteran's preference is to exclude virtually all 
women from the top civil service positions desired by meno 
While the legislature's purpose, rewarding public service in 
the military, was worthy, the means were not grounded on a 
convincing factual rationaleo The preference -was not related to 
job performance. Less drastic alternatives, such as a 
system which added points to a veteran's test score, were 
available. The preference was not limited to those who have 
shortly returned to civilian life. Although the statute was 
not designed for the sole purpose of subordinating women, 
"its clear intent was to benefit veterans £ven at the expense 
of women" and Davis was distinguishable. Here the discriminatory 
impact was "natural, forseeable, and inevitable." The 
legislature could be charged with knowledge of sex discrimination 
in the military, and, because in the past certain women-only 
jobs were exempted, it could also be inferred that the legi slature 
preference 
knew the/statute favored men. The impact on aee and her class 
was "devastating." The preference was not job-related. Unlike 
the defendants in Davis, the defendants here had not shown 
affirmative recruiting efforts or a recent rise in the 
proportion of the minority in the civil service workforce. Judge 
Cambell concurred, saying the system was one "of absolute 
preference which makes it virtually impossible for a woman, no 
matter how talented, to obtain a state job that is also of 
interest to males." It was thus unlike the test in Davis 
on which a black might "by dint of extra effort," improve his 
score. 
Judge Murray reiterated his prior dissent. The 
preference statute is not on its face gender-based. It has 
not been shown to be a pretext for discriminating against 
women. It favors veteran women, and disfavors non-veteran men. 
5 
While the statute has a weightier impact on the relevant 
group than did the test challenged in Davis, "impact alone 
is not determinative." A legislature's choice to prefer 
veteran>"implies invidious intent only if it appears 
inconsistent with expected and valid considerations." While 
the state could co~sider job-relatedness and relocation 
benefits, it could also simply desire to reward veterans. 
The statue is :rationally tailored to meet that goal, and 
the less drastic alternatives posed by the majority would 
also reduce the benefit to veterans. Since Davis, three 
courts have rejected equal protection challenges to state 
veteran's preference statutes. Bannerman v. Department of 
Youth Authority, 436 F. Supp. 1273, 1279-1281 (N.D. Cal. 
1977) (Schwarzer, Jo); Branch v. DuBois, 418 F. Supp. 1128, 
1131-1133 (N.D. Ill. 1.976) (Tone CAJ; Will, Decker DJs); 
Ballou v. State Department of Civil Service, 148 N.J. Super. 
112, 372 A.2d 333 (N.J. App. Div. 1977), aff'd, 46 U.S.L.W. 
2454 (NJ 1978)(per curiam). 
3. CONTENTIONS: Appt makes two arguments. First, 
the district court's decision conflicts with Davis and 
requires summary reversal. The proof of discriminatory intent 
is insufficient. The statute is neutral on its face, and 
the contrary v~ew expressed in a footnote in Judge Tauro's 
opinion for the court, App. Alln.7, is without merit. By 
relying on both forseeability of impact and actual impact to 
show intent the court countermanded the instruction to heed 
6 
Davis, which held that intent cannot 'be inferred from impact 
alone. The additional factor relied on, the lack of job-relatedness, 
is grossly overstated. The veteran's preference statute was 
primarily intended to benefit qualified individuals for their 
prior service to the nation. By focussing on job-relatedness 
alone, the court confused the Equal Protection Clause with 
Title VII. In its earlier opinion the court admitted the "purpose" 
of the statute was not "disqualifying women." 
Second, appt says the veterans' preference statute 
rationally promotes legitimate state interests and so is 
constitutional. Sex classifications are not judged by the 
compelling state interest test. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 
190, 197 (1976). The court therefore erred in inquiring into 
less restrictive alternatives. With the exception of the 
decision below, the federal courts have uniformly rejected 
equal protection challenges to veterans' preference statutes. 
Furthermore, because veteran's preference is merely one factor 
that is considered in an elaborate civil service program, 
it satisfies the constitutional test adopted by Mr. Justice 
Powell in University of California v. Bakke, 46 U.S.L.W. 
4896 (June 27, 1978). 
lt 
~ee responds that the court analyzed the "totality 
of the relevant facts" and properly found discriminatory intent 
under Davis. Subjective ill-will is not required. The 
impact on women was both forseeable and devastating. Impact 
is one indicator of intent. See United States v. School District 
128 
of Omaha, 565 F.2d 127/(8th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 
46 U.S.L.W. 3526 (No. 77-728; Feb. 21, 1978). The district 
court also relied on the state's historical us~ of separate 
requisitions for women, the exemption of those jobs from 
the veteran's preference statute, and the resulting 
paternalistic stereotyping. 
Aee also maintai~that the statute does not 
meet the requirements of Craig, which are that it "must 
serve important governmental objectives and must be 
substantially related to the achievement of those objectives." 
This heightened scrutiny is justified because the statute 
is based on "old notions" that a woman's place is in the 
home, and it excludes women from jobs because of circumstances 
beyond their control. The district court properly found 
that this statute is not carefully tailored to meet the 
state's objectives because the state could use other means 
to aid veterans which would not be at the expense of women. 
4. DISCUSSION: The Court in Davis said impact could 
show intent when impact could not be explained on nondiscriminatory 
grounds. 426 U.S. at 242. Here the court reasoned that neither 
job~relatedness nor relocation explained the statutory· strlicture, 
yet failed to consider whether the third justification, rewarding 
those who served, did so. Even if the statutory structure 
is sufficiently related to "old notions" to satisfy the intent 
element, rewarding veterans may be important enough to enable 
the statute to withstand scrutiny. Cf. Schlesinger v. 
Ballard, 419 U.S. 498 (1975)(discrimination against men in 
naval discharges permissible). The prior case of this 
Court provide no definitive answer. 
Both Bannerman and Branch involved point systems 
8 
which resemble the veteran's preference for most of the federal. 
civil service. Consequently, those cases can be distinguished 
from this one, where the preference is "absolute." The 
conflict with Ballou, a New Jersey decision, however, is 
square, and, if the judgment below were affirmed, the 
veterans 
constitutionality of 5 U.S.C. §3310, which gives/an absolute 
as 
preference for some jobs, e.g./elevator operators, would be 
subject to serious question. See Anthony, 415 F.Supp. at 
499n.l3. 
~ 
On remand, C).ee sought to amend the complaint to add 
a cause of action under the Equal Rights Amendment to the 
Massachusetts state constitution. After the state stipulated 
ff 
that it would not raise the defense of estoppel if ~ee brought 
a subsequent action· in state court, the court below denied 
aee's motion. Aee does not now argue that denial was in error 
and therefore the state constitutional question is not before 
this Court. 
There is a motion to affirm. 
I would note probable jurisdiction. 
9/25/78 MUnford opinion in juris. 
statement 
To my mind there are at least two issues meriting 
review here. Firs~)( I think there is a real problem concerning 
the application~fvwashington v. Davis. It certainly seems 
that there are ~lternative explanations for the veterans' 
preference having nothin to do with discrimination against 
women. Moreover, the preference discriminates agaLnst a } 
raFge number of men who also have not se~ved during wartime. 
Second, there is the problem ofv.What state interest 
is required to justify a statute that discriminates on the 
basis of sex. Even if the justifications for the preference 
yould be inadequate if this were a suspect classification, 
\( they may be sufficient to support a sexual classification. 
Accordingly, I would note. 
David 
t:ourt Voted on .... ~ ............ , 19 . . . 
Argued ................... , 19 .. . Assigned .................. , 19 . . . 
Submitted ................ , 19 . . . Announced ................ , 19 . . . 
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MEMORANDUM 
TO: David DATE: Feb. 20, 1979 
FROM: Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
78-233 Personnel Administrator v. Feeney 
This is the troublesome case involving the 
validity of Massachusett's Veterans Preference Act with 
respect to civil service positions. 
The case has been here twice before. On the first 
time we remanded it to ascertain whether - under 
Massachusetts law - whether the Attorney General of ·the 
state had authority to appeal over the express objections of 
the nominal defendants. On the second "round", we remanded 
the case to the District Court for reconsideration in light 
of Washington v. Davis. 
The three-judge court, on this remand, reaffirmed 
its prior decision invalidating the Veterans Preference 
statute on the ground that it discriminated invidiously 
against women. A majority of the three-judge court met the 
Washington v. Davis argument by concluding, in effect, that 
the leqislature must have intended the natural and 
inevitable effect of the statute: namely, that women, so 
few of whom were permitted to or did serve in military 
service, were denied access to civil service positions. 
Judqe Campbell's concurring opinion states, more 
clearly than I have seen stated previously, the rationale of 




Protection Clause simply cannot be applied literally so that 
all state-conferred benefits will be available equally to 
all citizens. Judqe Campbell, nevertheless, concluded that 
despite the facial neutrality of this statute, its 
inevitable effect was discriminatory. 
Massachusetts argues strongly to the contrary, and 
it is supported by a 42-paqe amicus brief by the Solicitor 
General (written by Frank Easterbrook). The SG's brief 
arques, persuasively, that the fallacy in the analysis of 
the three-judge District Court is that the statute was 
intended to benefit veterans, a laudable and legitimate 
purpose, and was not intended to discriminate against women. 
If the doctrine of "purposeful discrimination" heretofore 
deemed to be the meaninq of the Equal Protection Clause is 
to be respected, and the authority of Davis and Arlinqton 
Heiqhts, the SG arques that veterans preference statutes 
must be sustained. A qood deal of emphasis is placed on the 
lonq history of such statutes, going back to President 
Lincoln. 
* * * 
David: I am not at rest in this important case, 
and will need all the help I can get from my clerks. In 
view of the discriminatory impact of the statute, my "qut 
reaction" is that it cannot be sustained under modern gender-





want to undercut or weaken the authority of Davis and 
Arlinqton Heights. As stated by Judge Campbell, the Fqual 
Protection Clause simply must have some principled limits, 
and I cannot join an opinion that reasonably could have the 
effect of invalidating classifications based on their 
"impact" or even their "inevitable effect". I do not want 
O)A..-
to place equal protection analysis an "effects" basis 
-"\ 
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Bobtail Bench Memorandum 
To: Justice Powell 
Re: Personnel Administrator of Mass. v. Feeney, 
No. 78~233 
At issue in this case is the constitutionality of 
Massachusetts' statutory system of giving veterans preference 
in the obtaining of stpte jobs. The question is whether the 
Massachusetts Legislature, in enacting the preference system, 
had the "purpose" of discriminating against women. The three-
judge court below, purporting to apply this Court's decision in 
Washington v. Davis, 426 u.s. 229 (1976), ruled that the 
discriminatory effect of the Massachusetts system was 
'•' 
. ~ '· (' 
•' . ' 
·'' .. ·.. , ,._• 
2. 
purposeful in that the legislators p~ssed the statute knowing 
that it would have a severely disproportionate effect on women. 
Appellants contend that in effect the lower court inferred 
intent from the mere foreseeability of discriminatory 
consequences, and that such an approach would emasculate the 
intent requirement of Washington v. Davis. The facts are 
adequately set forth in the briefs, and I will proceed directly 
to the legal issue involved. 
1. Discriminatory Effect 
Despite the plain findings of the three-judge court to 
the contrary, appellant suggests that, quite apart from the 
Legislature's intent, the the Massachusetts veterans preference 
scheme does not in fact discrimate against women. Thus, 
appellant contends that under the veterans preference system 
many women nonetheless are hired to various posts in the 
State's civil service; indeed, more non-veteran women have 
been hired in the last ten years than veteran men. 
Additionally, one could contend that there is no discrimination 
whatever against women as such. Rather, the distinction is 
between veterans and non-veterans. All non-veterans suffer an 
--------------~ ·-
equal disability regardless of their gender. 
I believe both of these arguments to be misplaced. In 
assessing the impact of the Massachusetts system, it is not 
enough to compare the number of women hired with the number of 
veteran men hired. Rather, the correct comparison should be 
between the percentage of women applying for civil service jobs 
who receive them, and the percentag~ of veterans applying for 
such jobs who receive them. If, for example, only 10% of all 
women applicants are given jobs, whereas 90% of all veteran 
applicants are given jobs, the discriminatory effect of the 
statute would be apparent. Indeed, even these figures may not 
adequately reflect the extent to which the Massachusetts system 
affects women's participation in the State's civil service, as 
there may be many women who would apply for jobs but for the 
discouraging influence of the veterans preference. 
Similarly, I find unpersuasive the argument that women 
are not discriminated against here because they are treated 
alike with all non-veterans. It cannot be denied that those 
who receive the benefits of the Massachusetts system are 
largely men--in fact, 98% men. Although the Massachusetts ---system necessarily affects some men, therefore, it is 
undeniable that the costs it imposes fall disproportionately -- -upon women. Under such circumstances, it is disingenuous to -----.......... 
say that there is no discriminatory impact upon women. Of 
'--·-· ---....,____ -· -
course, the fact that the distinction is between veterans and 
non-veterans may be strong evidence that it was not intended to 
discriminate against women as such. This, however, is a 
question of the purpose of the disproportionate impact--not 
whether such an impact exists. 
2. Discriminatory Intent or Purpose 
' 
The key question here, then, is whether the admittedly 
~




preference scheme can be said to be "purposeful discrimination" 
against women. In Vi llq_ge ,of Ar 1 ii;lgton .J:!e ights . v. Metropolitan 
Housin~ Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977), the Court suggested the 
ways in which one could determine whether a legislative or 
administrative act was intentionally discriminatory. First, 
the Court suggested that if there were a clear pattern of 
otherwise unexplained discriminatory effect, a court might 
infer a discriminatory purpose. Alternatively, the Court 
stated that the historical background of a governmental action --------------
might demonstrate the purpose behind the action. For example, 
in some cases an unusual deviation from normal procedure or 
substance would be a hallmark of some invidious objective. 
Finally, the Court suggested that in some unusual circumstances 
direct evidence from the decision makers might be called for. 
In the present case, as I have discussed above, there 
is a plainly disproportionate impact upon women. Whether this 
is "a pattern as stark as that in Gomillion or ~~," 
Arl~nqton Heights, at 266, is a question over which one might 
debate. Even if it is, however, there is an explanation for 
the disparity of treatment that has nothing to do with women. 
Thus, all the judges below were in apparent agreement that the 
Massachusetts Legislature's desire in enacting a veterans 
preference scheme was only to benefit veterans--not to harm or - ---------
otherwise affect women. Furthermore, I am satisfied that there 
'---
little in the history of the veterans preference legislation 
support an inference of invidious intent. Although it 
4. 
7 
cannot be denied that legislators (and people generally) had 
' 
conceptions concerning women in the nineteenth century that we 
would consider anachronistic today, there is little evidence 
that such notions played any substantial role in the framing of 
Massachusetts' veterans preference statute. 
Under the analysis set forth by the Court in Arlington 
Heights, therefore, it is difficult to conclude that the 
Massachusetts veterans preference statute is intentionally 
discriminatory. At the same time, however, in Wash~ngt?n~ 
Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976), the Court explicitly stated that in 
some cases the plainly disproportionate effect of a statute 
~ 
would be probative evidence of a legislature's intent to 
discriminate. The difficult issue in this case, therefore, is 
how best to reconcile the undeniable, express objective of the 
Massachusetts statute (the benefitting of veterans) with the 
undeniable, undoubtedly ~o~seen effects of the statute (the 
disabling of women.) There are three possible arguments for 
ignoring the plain objective of the Legislature and striking 
down the Massachusetts statute as one that discriminate against 
women: (1) the statute incorporates the intentional 
discrimination present in federal armed services policies; (2) 
a legislature should be deemed to "intend" the reasonably 
foreseeable consequences of its actions; and (3) at some point, 
the certainty and extent of discriminatory effect constitute 
conclusive evidence of discriminatory intent. I shall address 
each of these arguments in turn. 
5. 
a. Incorporation 
Appellees argue strenuously that the statute in issue 
here is quite different from the employment practice involved 
in Washi~gton v. Dav~s. Thus, in Washington v. Davis the 
employer administered a test neutral on its face to determine 
job qualifications. Although the results of this test 
generally disfavored Negroes, there was no necessary tie 
between the test and past acts of intentional discrimination. 
Here, on the other hand, the Massachusetts statute explicitly 
draws a distinction based upon service in the armed forces--a 
quality that unquestionably h9s been distributed according to 
gender on purpose. Thus, appellees urge that legislative 
actions should be deemed to be purposefully discriminatory 
irrespective of the intentions or desires of the legislature, 
provided that the actions incorporate the purposefully 
discriminatory actions of others. 
It is difficult, however, to cabin the principle ---
appellees argue for. Thus, over time there have been countless 
ways in which societal benefits and status have been given on 
the basis of intentionally discriminatory criteria. For 
example, until the last twenty years many Negroes were 
purposefully excluded from many colleges and universities. To 
say, however, that any distinction according to one's college 
education is therefore purposefully discriminatory would be 
absurd. Thus, I would reject appellees' incorporation 
argument, as I can see no ready limitation on its 
6. 
ramifications. 
b. Foreseeable Consequences 
Alternatively, appellees contend (and are supported in 
their contention by Judge Tauro's opinion below) that 
legislatures, like tortfeasors, should be deemed to "intend" 
the natural and foreseeable consequences of their acts. The 
foreseeability of the Massachusetts' statute's leading to a 
disproportionate impact on women is beyond question. Thus, 
appellees and Judge Tauro conclude that the Massachusetts 
Legislature intended to discriminate against women. 
One difficulty with the "foreseeablity" argument is 
readily apparent: Like appellees' incorporation argument, it 
could not be limited in any way that would preserve the 
effectiveness of the Washington~\ Davis limitation upon the 
Fourteenth Amendment. There is another fundamental difficulty 
with this approach, however, as it misperceives the basic 
rationale underlying the intent requirement of this Court's 
decisions. 
As I understand it, there are two good reasons for the - - - ~ 
requirement that discrimination be intentional to be --unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment. First, by 
requiring an intent to discriminate, the Court eliminates many 
general social equality questions. For example, if 
disproportionate impact were in itself enough to warrant 
application of the Equal Protection Clause, every social 




statistically by the courts to deter~ine who was affected and 
in what way. Second, by permitting those actions motivated 
solely by purposes other than invidious discrimination, the 
Court allows legislatures to legislate for the social good 
without constant monitoring and tinkering by the judiciary. In 
those cases where we know that no discriminatory purpose lay 
behind an enactment, we may be reasonably certain that some 
social benefit will result. On the other hand, no such social 
benefit is likely to be obtained by the application of 
statutes, for example, that are designed to harm Negroes. 
Under this rationale, it makes no sense whatsoever t~ 
assume that legislatures intend the foreseeable consequences of 
their actions. Where legislatures act soley to achieve some 
------ --laudatory purpose, we have the necessary assurance that some --
good will result, whether or not the legislature also is aware 
that there will be some unavoidable, but incidental, disparate 
impact. Similarly, with the state of social science such as it 
is, it is difficult to say that any effect of a given piece of 
legislation was unforeseen by the legislating body. In sum, I 
conclude that the normal tort principles concerning 
foreseeability of consequences are inapplicable to adjudication 
under the Fourteenth Amendment. 
c. Certainty and Extent of Disparate Impact 
Finally, one could adopt what I understand to be Judge 
Campbell's approach and say that at some point the certainty 
and extent of disparate impact is so great that it should be 
taken to be conclusive evidence of the legislature's intent. 
(Alternatively, one could read Judge Campbell's opinion to say 
that there is an exception to Washington~. Davis where the 
disparate impact is great and certain. These are, however, 
only two ways of saying exactly the same thing.) 
In many ways, this is the most attractive of the 
alternative arguments presented for affirmance. Thus, by 
reading strictly the certainty and extent of the 
disproportionate impact required, one could limit narrowly the 
scope of this case. For example, one could easily distinguish 
Washing~on v. Davis by noting that, although there was a 
palpably different impact on Negroes applying for jobs in the 
District of Columbia, no such certain difference was to be 
anticipated with respect to the nation as a whole, which is the 
area for which the employment test was adopted. Indeed, a fair 
reading of Justice Stevens' concurring opinion in WashingtoQ ~-
Davis would come close to this position. 
Although Judge Campbell's position is attractive for 
its narrow reach, I find it difficult to accept analytical!~. 
~~ ._--...... 
Thus, insofar as certainty and extent of effect are probative 
of intent, there is little need to draw a per se rule that they 
will be determinative in some cases. Rather, it should be 
sufficient to say, as the Court did in Waspinqton v. Davis, 
that a court must take into account the sum total of the 
circumstances and infer the purpose of the legislature or 






take this tack here is that he found it necessary to overcome 
explicit findings that the objective of the Massachusetts 
Legislature was solely to benefit veterans. If the certainty 
and extent of impact is not enough to overcome such evidence in 
a general balancing procedure, however, then it should not be 
enough to warrant any qeneral rule. Unless you conclude that 
the certainty and extent of the disparate impact in this case 
is sufficient to overcome the manifest reason for the adoption 
of the Massachusetts' veterans preference system, therefore, I 
think you should vote to reverse the three-judge court. 
3. Conclusion 
In conclusion, the Court should carefully consider the 
language it uses in writing this opinion. Thus, I see this as 
a valuable opportunity for setting forth with some clarity what 
the Court means when it uses terms such as "purpose" and 
"intent" in Fourteenth Amendment adjudication. For me, there 
is no meaningful distinction between the two words. Moreover, 
it is possible for a legislature to adopt a statute knowing it 
will operate in a certain fashion without "intending" it to do 
so. Thus, I would adopt Professor Brest's notion that 
something is a "purpose" of a decisionmaker in adopting a rule 
only if it is an "effec[t] that the decisionmaker seeks to 
establish or retain by promulgation of the rule." See Brest, 
supra, at 104. In the present case, disabling women cannot be 
said to be a purpose of the Legislature in adopting 
-
Massachusetts' veterans preference system because we have no 
1 1 • 
reason to believe that such disabling was anything that the 
' 
Massachusetts Legislators sought to bring about. 
2/26/79 David 
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JUSTICE WILUAM H . REHNQUIST 
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May 7, 1979 
/ 
Re: No. 78-233 - Personnel Administrator of Mas$;-:;chusetts 
v. Feeney 
Dear Potter: 
Please join me. 
Sincerely~ 
Mr. Justice Stewart 
Copies to the Conference 
May 8, 1979 
78-233 Personnel Administrator v. Feeney 
Dear Potter: 
Please ioin me. 
Mr. Justice Stewart 
lfp/ss 




No. 78-233 Personnel Administrator v. Feeney ~ ~ 
MR. JUSTICE POWELL, concurring. 
I agree with the Court that although the~ 
~ 
Masssachusetts Veterans Preference Statute overtly~e~~~J~ ee_ 
discriminates against all nonveterans, it was never
intended to discriminate against women. I 
therefore join the Court's opinion. 
In doing so, I emphasize what is implied 
in Part IV of the opinion: Veterans' hiring 
preferences "represent an awkward - and many argue, 
unfair - exception to the deeply shared view that 
merit and merit alone should prevail in the 
employment policies of government." Ante, at 23. 
In view of the antiquity of such statutes at both 
the national and state levels, and as the issue is 
not before us, I express no considered 
constitutional judgment. But I do question the 
social utility, if not the constitutional validity 
of laws that have a seriously discriminatory effect 
on women as well as a similarly discriminatory 
effect - intended as such - against all non-
veterans. 
The traditional justifications advanced 
2. 
in support of veterans preference statutes may have 
been valid when enacted earlier in our history. 
See, ante, at 7. One may doubt, however, the 
rationality of these justifications in a period 
when such a large percentage of the population is 
composed of veterans of three major wars within the 
past third of a century. The record statistics in 
this case are illuminating. Over one-quarter of 
the Massachusetts population are veterans. Ante, 
at 13. It is said, as one of the state interests 
served by those statutes that they "encourage 
patriotic service" despite the fact that a large 
percentage of all veterans were drafted. Secondly, 
it is argued that a purpose is to "ease the 
transition from military to civilian life", a 
transition that hardly extends for the lifetime of 
a veteran - many if not most of whom became 
civilians many years ago. Nor is there reason to 
believe that veterans generally are more "loyal and 
well disciplined" than other applicants for state 
employment. This leaves, as perhaps the only 
continuing justification, a desire "to reward 
veterans for the sacrifice of military service". 
3. 
In many instances the sacrifice was indeed severe. 
But as a justification for munificent and 
indiscriminate preference, I find it unconvincing. 
.®ttprttn.e <!fot of tlrt ~t~ .itzrltg 
'Dag!pngfott. gl. <!f. 20,5>1-.;J 
CHAMBERS OF 
.JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL 
May 8, 1979 
Re: No, 78-233 - Personnel Administrator of 
Massachusetts v. Feeney 
Dear )?otter: 
I await the dissent, 
Sincerely, 
T.M. 
Mr. Justice Stewart 
cc: The Conference 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMU N 
;§uprtm.t <!J ttu.rt ttf tJr.t ~nitt~ .;%ihtttg 
~ltilJrhtghm, ~ . <!f. 20gt.lt.;l 
May 8, 1979 
Re: 78-233 - Personnel Administrator of Mass. v. Feeney 
Dear Pot t er: 
Please join me. 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Justice Stewart 
cc: The Conference 
CHAMBERS OF" 
.JUSTICE BYRON R. WHITE 
~tmt <!fttttrl of tltt ~tb ~taftg 
JTagJringftttt. ~. '!f. 2LT~Jt;~ 
May 17, 1979 
/ 
Re: No. 78-233 -- Personnel Administrator 
of Massachusetts, et al. 
v. Helen B. Feeney_.._. 
Dear John: 
Please add my name to your concurring 
opinion in this case. 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Justice Stevens 
Copies to the Conference 
CHAMBERS OF 
THE CHIEF JUSTICE 
~u.pttm:t Qfonrl.ttf tlrt~b ~ta#ll 
.. ufringhtn. ~. <!J. 20fi'!~ 
May 23, 1979 





Mr. Justice Stewart 
Copies to the Conference 
CHAMBERS OF 
.§ltptttttt <!Jcurl of flrt ~tfttb .§hdtlt 
Jl'IW'lfhtgion.lB. <.q. 2l1p~~ 
JusTtcE w ... J . BRENNAN, JR. May 25, 1979 
RE: No. 78-233 Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts 
v. Feeney 
Dear Thurgood: 
Please join me in the dissenting opinion you have 
prepared in the above. 
• 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Justice Marshall 
cc: The Conference 
CHAMBERS OF" 
.:§u:prttttt <!Jctttt cf tfrt 'Jlltti:Uh j)taft~ 
~N$frhtghnt. Ifl. <!J. 20,?)1~ 
-JUSTICE Wo. . -.1. BRENNAN, -JR . May 30, 1979 
/ 
/ 
RE: No. 78-233 Personnel Administrator, etc. v. Feeney 
Dear Thurgood: 
Since I've joined your fine dissent in the above, 
I'll withdraw my separate dissent. 
Sincerely, 
lkl 
Mr. Justice Marshall 
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